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I. INTRODUCTION
The civil justice system of the United States has been indicted for failing to
efficiently handle the increased burdens placed on it by modem society; some
have even charged that it has become an excessive economic burden on
America. 2 The system has been plagued for the past thirty years with excessive
costs and long delays.3 The United States annually spends an estimated $80
billion in direct costs and another $300 billion in indirect costs on a legal system
which is no longer viewed as providing expedient results.4 Some in the federal
judiciary, most notably former Chief Justice Warren Burger, have asserted that
there is rampant abuse and misuse of the civil justice system by attorneys,
especially during the discovery phase of litigation. 5 Abuse of the discovery
rules 6 is perceived by practitioners, judges, and academics as the primary cause
of excessive costs and delay in civil litigation.7
2Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979,979(1992); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 560 (1992); see also Edwin
W. Green & Douglas S. Brown, Back to the Future: Proposals for Restructuring Civil
Discovery, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 225, 235 (1992) (proclaiming that "[w]e no longer can afford
the current system").
3 Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, supra note 2, at 979. Also, the
annual number of lawsuits filed in federal courts has quadrupled from approximately
51,000 in 1960 to almost 218,000 in 1990. Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 2, at 560
(citing FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORTS 30 (June 1, 1990); DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 133 (1990)).
4Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, supra note 2, at 979; Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, supra note 2, at 560. Whether the civil justice system is providing just
results will not be discussed here, although costs and expediency are components of ajust system.
5See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 79, 95-96 (1976); see also Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma
of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17,39 (1988) (tracing the diagnosis of the discovery
abuse problem to former Chief Justice Burger's keynote address at the Pound
Conference in 1976).
6 Discovery abuse can be categorized as: (1) overuse of discovery, and (2) misuse of
discovery procedures. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 42. The objective in overuse is to
overwhelm your opposing party with discovery information by making overly broad
discovery requests or by broadly interpreting an opponent's discovery requests. Id. The
objective in misuse is to avoid disclosure of relevant information through strained or
technical interpretations of discovery requests and the federal rules. Id.
7 Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 190 n.4 (1992); BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, JUsTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 6-7(1989). Contra Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 375,386 n.29 (1992) (asserting that the civil justice reform movement is based on
the unproven assumption that cost and delay is a problem in all federal district courts).
Judge Barefoot Sanders, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, assessed the discovery abuse situation by commenting:
I estimate that two-thirds to three-fourths of our civil cases,
probably more, have little or no problem with respect to discovery
19951
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Numerous discovery reform proposals have been debated during the past
twenty years in response to the purported civil justice crisis.8 Congress enacted
the Civil Justice Reform Act 9 in 1990 to address concerns "about litigation and
discovery abuse in civil lawsuits, mounting expense and delay in those cases,
and declining federal court access."10 The CJRA encouraged federal district
courts to experiment with mandatory disclosure in discovery as one of many
avenues of civil justice reform.11 These experiments are on-going in many
federal district courts.
Concurrent with the implementation of the CJRA, the Judicial Conference
of the United States undertook its own reform program.12 On November 27,
1992, the Judicial Conference transmitted its proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Supreme Court.13 The amendments
included a major overhaul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 that gives
district courts the option of requiring the mandatory disclosure of certain
information prior to the commencement of formal discovery.14 The Supreme
Court transmitted the amendments to Congress without an endorsement.15
The amended rules subsequently went into effect on December 1, 1993, when
matters. A relatively few cases require massive and constant
intervention; ....
A few lawyers overwhelm their opponents with discovery. The
problem exists almost exclusively in metropolitan areas ....
Comments of Judge Barefoot Sanders, United States District for the Northern District of
Texas (Dec. 2,1991), quoted in Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1992).
8 See, e.g., William E. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reform, 50 U. PIr. L. REV. 703 (1989); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb:
The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569
(1989); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth:
An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); see also Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse:
Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 1, 2,3 n.14, 4(1982) (discussing the explosion of
legal commentary on discovery abuse).
9 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,104 Stat. 5089-98 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. II 1990)) [hereinafter CJRA].
10 Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507,508 (citing S. Rep. No. 416,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990)).
1128 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (Supp. 1I 1990).
12 Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993).
13 Transmittal letter from L. Ralph Mecham to the Supreme Court (Nov. 27, 1992),
reprinted in ORDERS, AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 113 S. Ct. 475,
588(1992).
14See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
15 Transmittal letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Rep. Thomas S. Foley
(Apr. 22, 1993), reprinted in ORDERS, AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 113 S. Ct. 475,477 (1992) (Scalia, Thomas, and Souter, J.J., dissenting).
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Congress failed to act on them.16 By its inaction, Congress has arguably placed
the cart before the horse by implementing mandatory disclosure before the
completion of the CJRA experiments with mandatory disclosure.
The objective of this note is to examine the CJRA experiments with
mandatory disclosure and, based on that examination, to propose an
alternative approach to the current trend of micromanaging case management
through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This note begins by defining
mandatory disclosure and providing a brief account of its origin. Next, the Civil
Justice Reform Act is described, followed by an examination of the various
CJRA mandatory disclosure experiments conducted by district courts
nationwide. The main portion of this note endeavors to apply some of the
lessons learned in the CJRA context to the flawed approach taken by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. I propose that the micromanagement of federal judges
through detailed, uniform case management rules should be abandoned.
Instead, district courts should be provided greater discretion in devising case
management rules which meet the unique needs of each district court. Finally,
I propose that some district courts may find that a resource-differentiated
approach to mandatory disclosure is an effective means of case management.
II. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. General Definition of Mandatory Disclosure
Informal, voluntary exchanges of information have long been practiced by
lawyers to avoid burdening judges17 with discovery requests and to expedite
an efficient exchange of information. 18 The growing lack of cooperation and
loss of civility among lawyers in recent years, however, has resulted in the need
for a more structured system of information exchanges in some courts. Thus,
a formal system of mandatory disclosure has been adopted in some state 19 and
federal courts.
16 Randall Sambom, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 39.
17For strategic reasons, lawyers usually avoid burdening judges with discovery
request problems out of a fear of being viewed as uncooperative. See Jack B. Weinstein,
What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear"s The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 649, 651 (1989).
18Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1991).
19Arizona, for example, adopted mandatory disclosure on July 1,1992. ARIZ. R. Civ.
P. 26.1. For an analysis of the Arizona rules, see generally Symposium: Mandating
Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil
Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1993). Alaska has also
adopted mandatory disclosure, and Illinois is considering a mandatory disclosure rule.
Jill Schachner Chanen, States Considering Discovery Reform-Alaska Next State to Adopt
Early, Automatic Disclosure; Illinois May Follow Suit, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 20. Arizona
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Zlaket, who chaired the committee which drafted the
1995]
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Mandatory disclosure, sometimes termed automatic disclosure,20 is an
approach to discovery requiring the voluntary disclosure of basic factual
information by all parties at the commencement of litigation.21 Mandatory
disclosure usually includes a continuing duty to supplement earlier disclosures
as new information becomes available.22
B. A Brief History of Discovery and Mandatory Disclosure
Formal discovery in civil litigation is the pretrial process through which
litigants may compel other litigants and third parties to disclose information
relevant to issues in dispute.23 Before the mid-nineteenth century, pretrial
discovery did not exist in English or American legal systems.24 Instead, the
facts of a case were developed through an exchange of pleadings. 25 State courts
in America led the way in liberalizing discovery with innovations such as
depositions and interrogatories. 26 The modem age of civil litigation in the
federal courts began with the merger of law and equity and the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.27
The Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,28 appointed
an Advisory Committee to promulgate procedural rules for a unified court
Arizona mandatory disclosure rule, has stated that at least fifteen other states have
inquired about Arizona's discovery rules. Id.
20 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263,
265-66(1992); Bell et al., supra note 7, at 3. A report on the CJRA by the Litigation Section
of the American Bar Association noted:
[D]isclosure is given many names, among them automatic disclosure,
automatic pre-discovery disclosure and mandatory disclosure. As one
attorney has aptly noted, the difference between automatic disclosure
and mandatory disclosure is not dissimilar to the fine line between a
necessary party and an indispensable party-the distinction is a gray
area at best.
LITIGATION SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 25 (1992).
21 Winter, supra note 20, at 265-66.
22 Id.
23 Wolfson, supra note 5, at 20 n.19.
24 1d. at 21. For comprehensive discussions of early common law practice, see
generally GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932); Robert W. Millar, The
Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 424
(1937); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863
(1933).
2 5 Wolfson, supra note 5, at 21.
2 61d. at 25-26.
2 71d. at 28.
2 8Act of June 19,1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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system. 29 The Advisory Committee made its recommendations to the Supreme
Court in late 1937, and the Court reported the proposed rules to Congress in
January 1938.30 Congress praised the new rules, which took effect on
September 16, 1938.31
The federal rules established pretrial discovery procedures, consigning the
pleadings to the role of mere notice devices.32 The pretrial discovery
procedures provided for depositions, interrogatories, document requests,
requests for admissions, and physical and mental examinations-the basic
discovery tools of the modem litigator.33 The scope of discovery included all
non-privileged information relevant to the subject matter of the case, which
was defined broadly to include inadmissible evidence that could reasonably
assist a party preparing for trial.34 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its liberal
approach to discovery a few years after enactment of the federal rules in
Hickman v. Taylor35 when it stated that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession."36 The Court has continued to advocate a liberal perspective
toward discoverable information.37
The intent of the draftsmen of the original federal rules, which has been
repeatedly echoed by the Supreme Court, was to eliminate the "sporting theory
of justice"38 by providing a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."39 To carry out their intent, the drafters of the federal rules
believed that civil discovery should result in "the location and disclosure of all
the unprivileged evidentiary data that might prove useful in resolving a given
29 Wolfson, supra note 5, at 32-33; Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEx. TECH L. REV. 323, 326 (1991).




341d. (citing Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943)).
35329 U.S. 495 (1947).
36 1d. at 507.
37 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981) (explaining the
substantial need and undue hardship standard for disclosure of attorney
work-product).
38 Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 703 (quoting Charles A. Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39,
40 (1964)). The framers' intent was for a party's victory in a case to be based on all the
facts, instead of going to the party who was best at manipulating the system. Id.; see also
Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. L. REV.
352, 394 (1990) (describing the underlying philosophy of the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
39 See FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
1995]
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dispute."40 The noble intent of the framers of the original federal rules,
however, have been undermined in modem times by discovery abuse
problems. 4 1
The recent inability of the federal rules to fulfill their original objective of
providing a just, expedient, and efficient resolution of cases resulted in two
amendments of the federal rules in the early 1980s geared to transform the role
of the judge from a neutral, passive participant to that of an active case
manager.42 In 1980, Rule 26(f) was adopted, allowing judges to supervise
discovery conferences.4 3 The 1983 amendments to Rules 11, 16, and 26
mandated sanctions for frivolous litigation and discovery abuse while
expanding judicial case management.44 These changes, however, failed to
rectify the perceived crisis in the civil justice system,45 causing civil justice
reform to become a political issue in the late 1980s.46
The suggestion of mandatory disclosure as a reform measure, which has
been controversial from its beginning, can be traced back to a proposal by Judge
Marvin E. Frankel.4 7 Othe r mandatory disclosure proposals followed.48 The
40Brazil, supra note 8, at 1298-99; seeJAMES W. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, 2 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RULES § 26.01, at 2441-45 (1938); Edson R.
Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737
(1939).
41Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 704.
42 1d. The changes reflect a revolutionary cultural change in American civil justice.
Having a civil justice system designed to preserve the judge as a neutral referee became
illogical in modern times because about 95 percent of all civil cases filed in federal courts
terminate without going to trial. Id. at 707-08. Negotiated settlements are preferred over
trial judgments as a less expensive form of resolving disputes. Consequently, the
premise of maintaining judicial neutrality through ignorance and impartiality was
abandoned in favor of thrusting judges into the role of an aggressive pretrial manager
who could encourage parties to settle their dispute without a trial. Id. at 706-09. But see
Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 525-28
(1980) (defending the adversarial system).
4 3Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 704.
441d.
45Dudley, supra note 7, at 199-204.
4 6 See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 385-88. All three branches of the federal government
devised civil justice reform plans (all largely identical) in the late 1980s and early 1990s:
Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990; the President's Council on
Competitiveness issued its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America in August 1991; a
Presidential Executive Order in October 1991 imposed reforms on executive branch
departments and agencies; and the Judicial Conference developed its amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect December 1, 1993. Id.
4 7Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued:More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54
U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982); Frankel, supra note 8, at 1057-59; see Monroe H. Freedman,
Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975) (attacking Judge Frankel's
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interest in mandatory disclosure spread steadily, culminating with its inclusion
in the CJRA and the adoption of Rule 26(a)(1). Also, at least two state courts
have adopted mandatory disclosure.49
III. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND RuLE 26
A. A Description of the Civil Justice Reform Act
The CJRA50 provides for the most radical procedural changes in the civil
justice system since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938.51 As explained by Professor Linda S. Mullenix,
The Act mandates local, grassroots rulemaking by civilian advisory
groups, a novel process that essentially circumvents the usual judicial
advisory committee system for civil procedure rule reform that has
been in place since 1938 ....
The central importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is this: the Act
has effected a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural
rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the legislative
branch.
52
The CJRA effectively decentralized the rulemaking process by mandating that
each federal district court adopt local rules.53 Attorneys practicing civil
proposal); H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to
Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975) (attacking Judge Frankel's proposal).
48 See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 721-23; Brazil, supra note 8, at 1348-61.
49 See infra note 19 (noting the adoption of mandatory disclosure by Arizona and
Alaska).
50Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,104 Stat. 5089-98 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1990)).
51 Mullenix, supra note 7, at 377; see Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 105, 105 (1991).
52 Mullenix, supra note 7, at 377,379. One goal of the legislation was "to achieve justice
from the 'bottom up,' from the 'users' of the system." Id. at 385; see Peck, supra note 51,
at 109-10.
53Mullenix, supra note 7, at 380; see generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992). Pursuant to FED. R.
CIv. P. 83, however, district courts have always had the power to adopt local rules,
provided they are adopted by a majority of the district judges and are not inconsistent
with the federal rules. Furthermore, some judges issue standing orders. Rule 83 permits
standing orders so long as they are not inconsistent with the federal rules or district
court rules. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1985 Amendment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A study by the Judicial Conference of the United States
identified more than 5,000 local rules. See COMMITTEE ON RULES PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT:
LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1989). Some legal commentators have advocated
reforms to make local rules uniform. SeeA. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments:A Study
in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567,1585-95 (1991); Note, Rule 83 and the Local
19951
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litigation in federal courts now have to research the local rules of the district
court where they bring their cases (or where they are brought or removed to). 54
Additionally, attorneys have to adapt to the regional nuances in the local rules
which may widen 55 the disadvantage for out-of-district practitioners.56
The CJRA required all federal district courts to develop and implement civil
justice expense and delay reduction plans by December 1993.57 Section 472 of
the CJRA required local advisory groups58 to assess the state of their district
court docket, to identify cost and delay problems, and to recommend an
expense and delay reduction plan for the district court.5 9 Section 473 states that
the advisory groups were to "consider and may include" the following
procedural devices to improve litigation management by reducing costs and
delays: differential case management; setting early, firm trial dates; controlling
the scope and timing of discovery; setting deadlines for disposition of motions;
judicial management of complex cases; mandatory disclosure; and authorizing
the use of alternative dispute resolution programs.60
Each district court devised its expense and delay reduction plan in
consultation with the advisory group and each plan was reviewed by a
two-person committee comprised of the chief judge of the district court and
the chief judge of the district court's respective circuit court of appeals. 61 The
CJRA also required all plans to be submitted to the Judicial Conference for
review.62 All ninety-four district courts have submitted their plans to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial
Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251 (1967); Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure
in the Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011.
54Mullenix, supra note 7, at 380-81; see also Tobias, supra note 53, at 1422-27 (discussing
numerous consequences for litigants under the promulgation of varying local rules).
Actually, it is a common, long-standing practice for litigators to familiarize themselves
with the local district court rules and standing orders of judges before which they are
to appear.
55In-district practitioners may already have advantages resulting from their local
reputations and rapport with judges in their district.
56 Tobias, supra note 53, at 1422-23.
57Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b)(1), 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1 1990)).
58Section 478 of the Act required the chief judge of each district court to select a
"balanced" advisory group "representative of major categories of litigants in such court."
Id. § 478.
5928 U.S.C. § 472 (Supp. 11990).
60Id. § 473.
61 Id. §§ 473-74.
62 Id. § 474.
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Center, which have acted as a clearinghouse for the plans.63 The district court
plans, which are to remain in effect for seven years from enactment of the CJRA,
will remain effective until December 1, 1997.64
The CJRA also provided for experimentation through a Demonstration
Program,65 a Pilot Program,66 and Early Implementation District Courts. 67 The
mandatory disclosure provisions resulting from the Expense and Delay
Reduction Plans of the thirty-four CJRA early implementation district courts
are the focus of this note. Only twenty of the CJRA early implementation district
courts68 adopted mandatory disclosure provisions. The remaining fourteen
courts experimented with other types of reform measures.
6 3Telephone interview with Mark D. Shapiro, Attorney-Advisor for the Court
Administration Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Jan. 4,
1994); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 472(d), 479 (Supp. H 1990). Copies of all CJRA documents filed
with the Administrative Office are available in WESTLAW, CJRA database (to obtain a
list of all documents on the database, use the search term "civil").
Also, the directors of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Federal Judicial Center are to assist the Judicial Conference in preparing a report to
Congress and in devising a Manual for Litigation Management and Cost and Delay
Reduction. Id. The report and manual will be based on the results of a RAND
Corporation study of the CJRA which is currently underway. Id. The RAND
Corporation study is using ten CJRA pilot courts as a study group, and ten comparable
districtcourts as a control group. Id. The RAND Corporation study was due in mid-1995,
and the Judicial Conference was supposed to issue its report by the end of 1995. Id.
Congress, however, has extended the deadlines by one year. Judicial Amendments Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345, § 4.
64 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b)(2).
65 Five district courts were designated by the Act as demonstration courts: Northern
District of Ohio, Western District of Michigan, Northern District of California, Northern
District of West Virginia, and the Western District of Missouri. See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104.
66 Ten district courts were designated by the Judicial Conference as pilot courts:
Southern District of California, District of Delaware, Northern District of Georgia,
Southern District of New York, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Western Districtof Tennessee, Southern District of Texas, Districtof Utah,
and the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 105.
67 Thirty-four district courts, which include the demonstration and pilot courts,
became Early Implementation District Courts by submitting their plans by December
31, 1991. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(c).
68 District of Alaska, Northern District of California, District of Delaware, Southern
District of Florida, Northern District of Georgia, District of Idaho, Southern District of
Illinois, Northern District of Indiana, District of Massachusetts, District of Montana,
Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York, Western District of
Oklahoma, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Eastern District of Texas, Southern District
of Texas, District of the Virgin Islands, Northern District of West Virginia, Eastern
District of Wisconsin, and the District of Wyoming.
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B. The New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
While the Civil Justice Reform Act was being implemented, the Judicial
Conference of the United States proceeded with amending the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.69 The Advisory Committee stated its rationale for the
amendment of Rule 26: "The information explosion of recent decades has
greatly increased the potential costs of wide-ranging discovery and thus
increased the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or
oppression."70 Despite overwhelming objections by lawyers,7 1 the amended
rules went into effect on December 1, 1993, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, when
Congress failed to act on them. 72 The amendments included changes to
numerous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the addition of a
mandatory disclosure provision in Rule 26.
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference, chaired by Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,73 developed its initial
mandatory disclosure rule proposal in June of 1990.74 The proposed rule was
circulated for comment in August of 1991.75 The mandatory disclosure
proposal was intensely criticized at two public hearings,76 and the Advisory
Committee withdrew its initial mandatory disclosure proposal in the face of
overwhelming opposition by practitioners.77 The Advisory Committee stated
that it was withdrawing the proposed amendment so that a future federal rule
could benefit from the mandatory disclosure experiences of the district courts
69 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
70 COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, proposed Rule 26(b)
(Aug. 1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 104 (1991) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON RULES
AUGUST 1991 DRAFr].
7 1See, e.g., Letter with an attached Memorandum from Dean Erwin N. Griswold,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, to the Justices of the Supreme Court, app. C (Feb. 10, 1993)
(on file with author) (listing 49 bar associations, business associations and government
agencies, 66 corporations, and more than 150 law firms, individual attorneys and judges
who filed formal comments in opposition to Rule 26(a)(1)). Associations, agencies and
organizations listed in the Memorandum as in opposition to Rule 26(a)(1) include the
American Bar Association Litigation Section, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
American Corporate Counsel Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the NAACP, and various state bar associations. Id.
72 Samborn, supra note 16, at 39-40.
73 United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
74 Bell et al., supra note 7, at 3.
75 D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathon R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: An
Experiment Gone Awry, DEF. COUNS. J. 17,17 (Jan. 1993).
76The hearings were in Los Angeles in November 1991 and Atlanta in February 1992.
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under the CJRA.78 In May 1992, however, the Advisory Committee reversed
itself by approving a modified mandatory disclosure proposal, 79 which
became the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1). 80
Rule 26(a)(1) 81 is important to this discussion for two reasons. First, its
drafting influenced the mandatory disclosure rules adopted by some early
implementation district courts under the CJRA.82 Second, it shows that when
78 Bell et al., supra note 7, at 34; Tobias, supra note 12, at 141.
7 9 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (May 1992).
8 0Tobias, supra note 12, at 141-42. Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., persuaded the
committee to reconsider the modified proposal. Id.; Winter, supra note 20, at 268-69.
81The new FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) states:
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated
or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone
number of each individual likely to have discoverable information
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,
identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession,
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under
Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or
protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based,
including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered
in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures
shall be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under
subdivision (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based on the
information then reasonably available to it and is not excused from
making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its investiga-
tion of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another
party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
82 See, e.g., Campbell & Kuhlman, supra note 75, at 18-19 (noting that many CJRA
mandatory disclosure provisions contain language similar to the preliminary draft of
Rule 26).
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district court judges are given discretion in whether to use a case management
rule, many judges will opt out of the standard federal rule.83
The evolution of Rule 26(a)(1) influenced the construction of some of the
mandatory disclosure rules adopted by district courts under the CJRA. For
example, the August 1991 draft of Rule 26(a)(1) limited the scope of mandatory
disclosure to information "likely to bear significantly on any claim or
defense."84 Many of the CJRA early implementation district courts use similar
language in defining the scope of their mandatory disclosure programs.85 The
"likely to bear significantly" language, which was heavily criticized as
ambiguous, was one reason why the Advisory Committee withdrew its initial
proposal.86 The Advisory Committee redefined the scope of discoverable
information from the "likely to bear significantly" language to that information
"relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."8 7 The
Advisory Committee's objective in modifying the standard was to even "an
uneven playing field favoring the plaintiffs in disclosure by requiring the
parties to 'trigger disclosure by pleading nonconclusionary facts. Where facts
are sparsely pleaded, as is often the situation in product liability cases, little
disclosure will be required.' "88 How many of the district courts will adopt this
standard remains an open question.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
84 See COMNUTTEE ON RULES AUGUST 1991 DRAFT, supra note 70, at proposed Rule
26(a)(1).
85 See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of Delaware, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSEAND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3 (Dec. 23, 1991) [hereinafter District of Delaware
Plan]; United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, CIVIL JUSTICE
DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 11 (Dec. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Southern District
of Illinois Plan]; United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Eastern
District of New York Plan]; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990 2-3 (Dec. 31,1991) [hereinafter Eastern District of Texas Plan].
86Bell et al., supra note 7, at 34; Tobias, supra note 12, at 141-42; Winter, supra note 20,
at 266-69.
87Bell et al., supra note 7, at 34; Tobias, supra note 12, at 141-42; Winter, supra note 20,
at 266-69. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) with COMMITTEE ON RULES AUGUST 1991 DRAFT,
supra note 70, at proposed Rule 26(a)(1). But see Memorandum to the Chief Justice of the
United States and the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Comments on Proposed
"Disclosure" Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) from Erwin N.
Griswold et al. 14-15 (Feb. 10, 1993) (criticizing the "relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings" as a broad definition which will lead to increased
satellite litigation to clarify disclosure obligations).
88 Bell et al., supra note 7, at 36 n.137 (quoting a letter from Circuit Judge Ralph K.
Winter to District Chief Judge Sam C. PointerJr., Chairman of the Advisory Committee
(Apr. 8, 1992) (on file with the Advisory Committee)). The letter was signed by six of
the fourteen Advisory Committee members.
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District courts can opt out of Rule 26(a)(1) by issuing standing orders setting
forth their own mandatory disclosure rules, by limiting the application of the
rule to certain types of cases, or by completely proscribing its use.89 The Federal
Judicial Center is tracking the actions taken by the 94 federal district courts in
response to the new Rule 26(a)(1). As of March 24, 1995, the Federal Judicial
Center found that 94 United States District Courts, Rule 26(a)(1) was in effect
in 45 courts, and it was not in effect in 49 courts.90 Six of the district courts with
Rule 26(a)(1) in effect are using it with a significant revision.91 Of the 49 district
courts where it is not in effect, 5 courts have their own variation of mandatory
disclosure through the CJRA or by local rule; 15 courts permit their judges to
use mandatory disclosure in specific cases; and, 1 court has mandatory
disclosure in effect for limited types of cases. 92 Thus, 21 of the 49 district courts
without Rule 26(A)(1) in effect may still use mandatory disclosure by order of
the judge or through local rules. In summary the Federal Judicial Center found,
[Clompared to a year ago, the number of courts requiring initial
disclosure has increased somewhat, including an increase in the
number of large courts requiring initial disclosure. There is also greater
stability in the Rule 26 picture now, in the sense that most courts have
reached a decision regarding implementation of the rule. As more
experience is gained with the rule, this picture may, of course,
change.
93
The Federal Judicial Center's findings must be cautiously considered because
Rule 26(a)(1) is still relatively new. The survey results show, however, that a
significant number of district courts are either entirely opting out of the federal
rule or are opting in favor of their own mandatory disclosure provision.
IV. THE CJRA EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRIcT COURT EXPERIMENTS
WITH MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The CJRA permitted each district court to address its own unique problems,
if any were found to exist, by tailoring individualized solutions.94 The
experiments with mandatory disclosure by twenty of the CJRA early
89 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, ORDER
IN RE LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PROcEDuRE (Dec. 1,1993) (standing order that Rule 26(a)(1)
will have no effect until further notice).
90 Memorandum from Donna Stienstra, Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center,
to Those With an Interest in the Federal District Courts' Response to Amended Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 4-5 (Mar. 24,1995) (on file with author).
91Id.
921d. at S.
93 1d. at 6.
94 Peck, supra note 51, at 109-10.
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implementation district courts exemplify how diverse the district courts can be
in developing local rules.
A. Variations in the Scope of Discoverable Information
More than half of the CJRA early implementation district courts with
mandatory disclosure define the scope of disclosure as information "likely to
bear significantly on any claim or defense."95 Other CJRA early implementation
districts have widely dissimilar standards regarding the scope of their
mandated disclosures. 96 The new Rule 26(a)(1) modified its definition of the
95 See District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 3; United States District and
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10 (Dec. 19, 1991) [hereinafter District of Idaho
Plan]; Southern District of Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 11; United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
29, app. B (Dec. 20,1991) (Judge Miller's experimental program) [hereinafter Northern
District of Indiana, Judge Miller's Plan]; Eastern District of New York Plan, supra note
85, at 4; United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 11 (Dec. 31,1991) [hereinafter Western District of
Oklahoma Plan]; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 13 (Dec, 31, 1991) [hereinafter
Eastern District of Pennsylvania]; Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 85, at 2-3;
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Standing Order for
Accelerated Discovery § 1.B (adopted Oct. 24, 1991), reprinted in Texas Rules of
Court-Federal-1993 (West 1993) [hereinafter Southern District of Texas Plan]; United
States District Court for the Virgin Islands, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN 37 (Dec. 23, 1991) [hereinafter District of the Virgin Islands Plan]; Report of the
Advisory Group, United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
78 (1991) [hereinafter Northern District of West Virginia Advisory Group Report];
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 12 (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinafter District of Wyoming Plan].
96 Compare United States District Court for the District of Montana, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN AND RELATED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, Rule
200-5 (Apr. 1, 1992) [hereinafter District of Montana Plan] (using a "reasonably likely to
bear on the claims or defenses" standard) with United States Court for the Northern
District of California, AMENDED GENERAL ORDER No. 34, CASE MANAGEMENT PILOT
PROGRAM, § VI.B (July 1, 1993) [hereinafter Northern District of California Plan]
(requiring identification of persons "known to have discoverable information about
factual matters relevant to the case" and reasonably available unprivileged documents
"that tend to support the positions that the disclosing party has taken or is reasonably
likely to take in the case") and United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 30-31, app. D (Dec. 20,1991)
(Judge Rodovich's experimental program) [hereinafter Northern District of Indiana,
Judge Rodovich's Plan] (requiring identification of persons believed to have
"information relating to the allegations contained in the complaint") and United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEw YORK CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 11 (Jan. 1993)
[hereinafter Southern District of New York Plan] (requiring the exchange of "all
documents relevant to the subject matter of the answer" and defining a document as
relevant "if it either (1) supports the material averments of thepleading or (2) contradicts
or otherwise makes less probable the material averments of the pleading").
[Vol. 43:147
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss1/11
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
scope to include information "relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings."97 Not all district courts, however, follow the
Rule 26(a)(1) standard. 98
Additionally, some CJRA plans 99 require the identification of legal issues and
supporting legal authority; these requirements are problematic in that they
may result in the inadvertent disclosure of the mental impressions and work
product of attomeys. 1°° A common criticism of mandatory disclosure is that it
impinges on the privileges that protect the attorney-client relationship.
10 1
Indeed, Judge Frankel's proposal preferred disclosure of relevant evidence
over preservation of the privileges.' 0 2 More recent mandatory disclosure
proposals, 103 including Rule 26(b)(1), leave intact the attorney-client
privilege.104
B. Variations in the Extent of Required Disclosure
The early implementation district plans also differ in the extent of their
mandated disclosures. For instance, some districts only require a description
of relevant 10 5 core information,106 while other districts require production of
97 The Advisory Committee took this definition from FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which
governs the special pleading requirements for "averments of fraud or mistake." Winter,
supra note 20, at 268-69; see FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The District of Massachusetts Plan also
defines the scope of discoverable information using the "relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings" standard. D. MASS. R. 26.2.
98 See sources cited supra note 96.
99 N.D. GA. R. 201-2; United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, app. A (Dec. 20,1991) (experimental
program of Judges Lee and Cosbey) [hereinafter Northern District of Indiana, Plan of
Judges Lee & Cosbey]; E.D. Wis. R. 7.07.
10OSee District of Montana Plan, supra note 96, at 16 (requiring the disclosure of the
legal theory supporting each claim or defense and requiring attorneys to summarize the
information believed to be held by identified persons); N.D. GA. R. 201-2 (requiring
disclosure of a succinct statement of the legal issues in the case; all applicable statutes,
codes, regulations, legal principles, standards and customs or usages, and caselaw;
pending or previously adjudicated related cases; and a detailed outline of expected
discovery); Northern District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee & Cosbey, supra note 99, at
28-29, app. A (requiring disclosure of the supporting legal authority for each cause of
action and/or defense).
101See Bell et al., supra note 7, at 46-48; Campbell & Kuhlman, supra note 75, at 20.
102Frankel, supra note 47, at 52.
103 See Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 721 n.58; Brazil, supra note 8, at 1351 (noting,
however, that the attorney-client privilege may need to be narrowed).
1041 am in favor of protecting the attorney-client privilege in connection with
mandatory disclosure. See Proposal infra part V.B.3.a.
1051n this section, the generic term "relevant" is used to describe responsive
information since the scope of disclosure varies from court plan to court plan.
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all relevant documents known to the attomeys.1 07 The extent of mandated
disclosure in the early implementation district plans can be categorized as core
information disclosure plans, automatic document production plans, or as
plans that provide litigants the option to exchange either disclosure statements
or documents.
1. Core Information Disclosure Plans
Core information disclosure plans mandate the disclosure of basic factual
information in one of two ways: exchange of statements disclosing certain
types of information, or exchange of court-constructed interrogatories.
a. Disclosure Statement Programs
Ten of the early implementation districts are experimenting with rules that
require each party to serve upon the opposing party a disclosure statement that
provides three basic types of information: (1) identification of persons known
to have information or knowledge relevant to the litigation; (2) a general
description of and the location of all documents relevant to the litigation; and
(3) the existence and content of insurance agreements relevant to the
litigation.108 Additionally, the District of Delaware, the District of Montana, the
Eastern District of New York, and the Western District of Oklahoma require the
106See, e.g., District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 3; Southern District of Illinois
Plan, supra note 85, at 11-12; District of Montana Plan, supra note 96, at 16-17; Eastern
District of New York Plan, supra note 85, at 4; Western District of Oklahoma Plan, supra
note 95, at 11-12; Eastern District of Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 13.
107 See Northern District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.B.2; Civil Justice
Advisory Group for the Southern District of Florida, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION REPORT AND PLAN 36 (1991) [hereinafter Southern District of Florida Plan];
Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 11.
108 See District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 3; Southern District of Illinois Plan,
supra note 85, at 11-12; District of Montana Plan, supra note 96, at 16-17; Eastern. District
of New York Plan, supra note 85, at 4; Western District of Oklahoma Plan, supra note 95,
at 11-12; Eastern District of Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 13; Northern District of
West Virginia Advisory Group Report, supra note 95, at 83; District of the Virgin Islands
Plan, supra note 95, at 37. The experimental program of Judges Moody and Lozano
require a joint report disclosing witnesses, damages computations, insurance coverage,
medical and employment records and authorization to obtain such records, and expert
witness opinions. United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 30, app. C (Dec. 20, 1991) (experimental
program of Judges Moody & Lozano). The disclosure mechanism for the District of
Alaska is called a Form Preliminary Pre-Trial Order and it requires disclosure of known
witnesses, location of relevant records, and identification of experts and expert records.
United States District Court for the District of Alaska, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE & DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN § il.B (Dec. 13,1991) [hereinafter District of Alaska Plan]. The Western
District of Oklahoma does not require identification of persons. See Western District of
Oklahoma Plan, supra note 95, at 11-12.
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disclosure of additional basic information through mandatory disclosure
statements.109
b. Interrogatory Programs
Three of the early implementation districts use interrogatories drafted by the
court as a means of requiring litigants to disclose core factual information about
the case.110 The experimental program of Judges Lee and Cosbey utilized both
court-constructed interrogatories and production of all relevant documents.111
In their court-constructed interrogatories, the Northern District of Georgia and
the Eastern District of Wisconsin mandate identification of known witnesses,
location of relevant documents, and disclosure of insurance agreements. 112 The
exact scope of disclosure under these rules can vary from question to question
and the courts usually frame the interrogatories in a very narrow manner.113
The effectiveness of court-constructed interrogatories has been questioned.
First, standardized interrogatories are of limited effectiveness since the
questions asked are not fact specific.114 Second, interrogatories often are
ineffective in eliciting useful information from crafty lawyers bent on being
uncooperative. 115 On the other hand, lawyers may be wary about evading
questions or objecting to questions drafted by the court itself.
109See Districtof Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 3 (requiring theadditional disclosure
of persons interviewed in connection with the litigation and the interviewers as well as
identification of retained expert witnesses); District of Montana Plan, supra note 96, at
16-17 (requiring the additional disclosure of the factual basis of every claim or defense,
the legal theory supporting each claim or defense, a summary of what information
believed to be held by identified persons, and a computation of any damages claimed);
Eastern District of New York Plan, supra note 85, at 4 (requiring both authorization to
obtain medical, hospital, no-fault and worker's compensation records and exchange of
the documents relied on by parties in preparing the pleadings or to be used to support
allegations); Western District of Oklahoma Plan, supra note 95, at 11-12 (requiring the
additional disclosure of (1) expert witnesses together with the expert's qualifications, a
statement of the experts expected testimony, and a summary of the grounds for the
expert's opinion and (2) a log listing all privileged documents).
1 10See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 201-2; Northern District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee &
Cosbey, supra note 99, at app. A; E.D. Wis. R. 7.07.
111Northern District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee & Cosbey, supra note 99, at app.
A.
1 12 N.D. GA. R. 201-2; E.D. Wis. R. 7.07.
113 For example, the Northern District of Georgia Plan states: "Describe or produce for
inspection (see FRCP 33(c)) each document in your custody or control or of which you
have knowledge which you contend supports your claim or claims." N.D. GA. R. 201-2.
114 Cf. Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure
Requirement of Proposed Rules 26and 37ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REV. LrIG.
77, 126-27 (1992) (discussing the limited effectiveness of standard, court-constructed
interrogatories).
l15 Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again
Timefor Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155,158(1991); Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal
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In addition to requiring basic information, the Northern District of Georgia
requires disclosure of the precise classification of the cause of action being filed
with a brief factual outline of the case; a succinct statement of the legal issues
in the case; identification of all applicable statutes, codes, regulations, legal
principles, standards and customs or usages, and caselaw; disclosure of
pending or previously adjudicated related cases; and a detailed outline of
expected discovery.116 The Eastern District of Wisconsin requires the additional
disclosure by defendants of the defendant's correct identification if the
defendant is improperly identified.11 7 The interrogatories of Judges Lee and
Cosbey in the Northern District of Indiana require the additional disclosure of
the legal authority supporting each cause of action and/or defense. 118
2. Automatic Document Production Plans
Rather than just mandating disclosure of the existence and location of
documents, document disclosure plans require the automatic production of all
relevant documents.119 Four of the early implementation districts require
automatic production of all relevant documents.120 These districts also use dis-
Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills?, 25 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 249, 273-74 (1993). Professor Mengler
noted that MagistrateJudge Wayne Brazil"has recounted that many litigants and judges
regard interrogatories as 'useless because any lawyer who can't answer interrogatories
without giving [an] opponent useful information is not worth his salt."' Mengler, supra,
at 158 (quoting Wayne D. Brazil, Viewfron the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 219, 233 (1980)).
1 16 N.D. GA. R. 201-2.
l1 7 E.D. Wis. R. 7.07.
118 Northem District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee & Cosbey, supra note 99, at app.
A.
ll 9 See, e.g., Northern District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.B.2 (requiring
disclosure of "[aill unprivileged documents in the party's custody or control that are
then reasonably available that tend to support the positions that the disclosing party
has taken or is reasonably likely to take in the case"); Southern District of New York
Plan, supra note 96, at 11 (in designated cases the court may mandate, within twenty-one
days of such designation, service on the opposing party of "all documents relevant to
the subject matter" of the complaint or answer).
120Northern District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.B.2; Southern District of
Florida Plan, supra note 107, at 36; Northern District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee &
Cosbey, supra note 99, at app. A (requiring response to court constructed interrogatories
and production of "[a ll documents, records, writings and things which show or tend
to show any fact pertaining to any claims or defenses you are asserting"); Southern
District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 11 (using automatic document production
in expedited cases). But see Southern District of Florida Plan, supra note 107, at 36-37
(acknowledging that "it is our experience that lawyers in this District routinely ignore
the voluntary exchange requirements of Local Rule 14 unless specifically ordered by the
Court in either a scheduling order or at a scheduling conference").
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closure statements for party identification of persons known to have
information relevant to the case.121
3. Early Implementation District Plans with Optional Means of Disclosure
Four of the early implementation districts and the new Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(1) use disclosure statements but allow parties the option of
producing documents rather than just disclosing the existence and location of
the documents.122 All of these plans require the parties to exchange a copy of,
or a description by category and location of, all documents relevant to the
litigation; the disclosure of the identity of persons known to have information
or knowledge relevant to the litigation; and the disclosure of the content of
insurance agreements relevant to the litigation. 123
The District of Massachusetts, the Southern District of Texas, Judge Miller's
program in the Northern District of Indiana, and Rule 26(a)(1) also require
parties to provide a computation of damages.124
C. Variations in the Duty Placed on Parties and Counsel
The early implementation districts also place varying duties on parties and
counsel for ensuring good faith compliance with their mandatory disclosure
rules. Many of the districts, such as the Northern District of California, require
each disclosure to be
[s]igned by at least one attorney of record whose signature constitutes
a certification that, to the best of his or her knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry that is reasonable under the
circumstances, the disclosure or supplementation is complete and
correct as of the time it is made.
125
12 1See, e.g., Northern District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.B.2; Southern
District of Florida Plan, supra note 107, at36; Northern Districtof Indiana, Plan of Judges
Lee & Cosbey, supra note 99, at app. I.
122 District of Idaho Plan, supra note 95, at 10; Northern District of Indiana, Judge
Miller's Plan, supra note 95, at 29, app. B; D. MASS. R. 26.2; Southern District of Texas
Plan, supra note 95, § 1.B.
123 See sources cited supra note 122.
124 Northem District of Indiana, Judge Miller's Plan, supra note 95, at 29, app. B; D.
MASS. R. 26.1;Southern District of Texas Plan,supra note 95, § 1.B. The Northern District
of Indiana and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) also require the parties to make available the
underlying documents supporting the damages claimed.
125Northern District of CaliforniaPlan, supra note 96, § VII.B.2; see also District of
Montana Plan, supra note 96, at 32; Western District of Oklahoma Plan, supra note 95, at
12; Eastern District of Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 14; Northern District of West
Virginia Advisory Group Report, supra note 95, at 88.
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Other districts require every disclosure and supplement to be signed by an
attorney of record or by the party if unrepresented. The signature
[c]onstitutes a certification under, and is consequently governed by,
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, in addition,
constitutes a certification that the signer has read the disclosure, and
to the best of signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete as of the time it was
made.
126
A few of the early implementation districts tie the duty of disclosure to the
sanction provisions of the federal rules, specifically Rules 11 and 37.127
The Eastern District of Wisconsin's plan requires that,
[i]f, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, a party is unable to
answer fully a mandatory interrogatory, the party is required to
provide the information currently known or available to the party and
to explain why the party cannot answer fully, to state what must be
done in order for the party to be in a position to answer fully, and to
estimate when the party will be in that position. 28
Several of the early implementation districts require only that the mandatory
disclosures be signed by the party or its counsel.129 Finally, some districts, such
as the Southern District of New York, do not discuss the compliance duty of
the attorneys or parties.130
D. Other Noteworthy Differences Between the Early Implementation Districts
1. Timing
One striking difference among the various early implementation district
plans is the timing of the mandatory disclosures. Depending on the plan,
timing of the mandatory disclosures may be tied to the date when the
complaint or answer is filed, when a party appears in the action, the date of the
scheduling conference, or a date set by the court.
126Southern District of Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 13.
127N.D. GA. R. 201-2; Eastern District of New York Plan, supra note 85, at 5; Eastern
District of Texas Plan, supra, note 85, at 5.
128 E.D. Wis. R. 7.07(c)(1).
129See, e.g., Northern District of Indiana, Plan of Judges Lee and Cosbey, supra note
99, atapp. A (requiring their court constructed interrogatories to be signed by theparty);
Southern District of Texas Plan, supra note 95, § 4 (requiring the disclosures "shall be
made in writing and signed by the party or counsel").
130Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 11; see also District of Idaho
Plan, supra note 95, at 10-11 (placing no specific duty on attorneys or counsel with regard
to their initial disclosure requirements); D. MAss. R. 26.2 (placing no duty on the
attorneys or parties for their automatic document disclosure rule).
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Two of the early implementation districts require parties to serve each other
with their initial mandatory disclosures within ninety days of the filing of the
complaint, regardless of whether the defendant has filed an answer to the
complaint.131 Some of the early implementation districts require mandatory
disclosures within thirty days after the defendant answers the complaint. 132
The Eastern District of Wisconsin requires the plaintiff to file its mandatory
interrogatories within thirty days of being served with an answer to its
complaint, and each defendant is given thirty days after being served with the
plaintiff's mandatory interrogatories. 133 Two of the early implementation
districts require each party to file its disclosure with its initial pleading.134 A
few of the early implementation districts and Rule 26(a)(1) structure the timing
of disclosure around a discovery scheduling conference. 135 In other early
implementation districts the court issues an order scheduling the timing of the
mandatory disclosure.136
2. Restrictions on Discovery and Supplementation of Disclosures
Some of the early implementation districts forbid additional discovery until
the disclosure is made.137 Additionally, most of the early implementation
131Northem District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VI.A; Southern District of
Florida Plan, supra note 107, at 36.
132 See, e.g., Northern District of Indiana, Judge Miller's Plan, supra note 95, at 29, app.
B; Eastern District of Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 13; Eastern District of New
York Plan, supra note 85, at 4; Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 85, at 2-3;
Southern District of Texas Plan, supra note 95, § I.D; District of the Virgin Islands Plan,
supra note 95, at37;seealsoSouthem Districtof Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 12 (requiring
the disclosures to be made within 20 days of the defendant's appearance in the action).
13 3E.D. Wis. R. 7.07.
13 4District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 3; N.D. GA. R. 201-2; see also District of
Idaho Plan, supra note 95, at 10 (requiring the plaintiff to make its disclosure within 30
days after service of the complaint and requiring the defendant to make its disclosure
within 30 days after service of its answer to the complaint).
Opponents of mandatory disclosure argue that mandating disclosure of
information at the beginning of a case is inherently flawed because crafty litigators
attempt to be vague in their pleadings. See Bell et al., supra note 7, at 42-43; Campbell &
Kuhlman, supra note 75, at 22. If, however, a complaint or answer is too vague to provide
a disclosure response, a party may always file a Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite
Statement.
135 See District of Montana Plan, supra note 96, at 16-17; Western District of Oklahoma
Plan, supra note 95, at 11-12.
136 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, 28-31, apps. A, B, C, & D (Dec. 20, 1991)(experimental programs of Judges Lee and Cosbey, Moody and Lozano, and Rodovich);
Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 11.
13 7Southem District of Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 12; Northern District of Indiana,
Judge Miller's Plan, supra note 95, at 29, app. B; D. MASS. R. 26.2; District of Montana
Plan, supra note 96, at 17; Eastern District of Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 14.
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districts require the mandatory disclosures to be supplemented on a continuing
basis throughout the action.138 Other districts, such as the Southern District of
New York, use mandatory disclosure only as an initial discovery
mechanism. 139
3. Restrictions on the Use of Mandatory Disclosure
Some of the early implementation districts limit their experiment with
mandatory disclosure to certain classifications of cases. The District of
Delaware restricts the use of mandatory disclosure to personal injury, medical
malpractice, employment discrimination, and civil RICO cases; the court did
not explain why it limited mandatory disclosure to these cases.140 The Southern
District of Texas is limiting its experiment with mandatory disclosure to a
minimum of twenty cases for at least one year.141 The Eastern District of
Wisconsin, which uses mandatory disclosure only for cases that have relatively
complex discovery needs, exempted the following types of cases from the
mandatory disclosure program: reviews of administrative proceedings, habeas
corpus cases, collection cases, pro se prisoner litigation, cases in which the only
relief sought is an order forcing arbitration, and very simple cases. 142 The
Southern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania permit
judges the discretion to exclude any case from the mandatory disclosure
requirements. 143
138 See, e.g., Northern District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.E; Southern
District of Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 12-13; Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note
85, at 5.
139 Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 11; see also District of Delaware
Plan, supra note 85, at 2-3; District of Idaho Plan, supra note 95, at 10-11.
14 0District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85, at 2-3; United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, Final Report from the Advisory Group Appointed Pursuant to the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 11.E.2(d) (Oct. 1, 1991).
14 1United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Cost and Delay
Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 5 (Oct. 24, 1991); Linda S.
Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas: Creating and
Implementing A Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REV.
LITIc. 165, 188-89 (1992).
142 E.D. WIs. R. 7.07(e) (defining simple cases as requiring no more than three
depositions, no more than fifteen interrogatories, discovery completed within nine
months, and requiring no more than twenty hours of trial time);seealso Eastern District
of New York Plan, supra note 85, at 4 (excluding social security, habeas corpus, pro se
cases, and certain civil rights cases); Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96,
at 2, 11 (using automatic document disclosure in cases designated as "expedited"
because of their "relative simplicity").
143 Southern District of Illinois Plan, supra note 85, at 11; Eastern District of
Pennsylvania Plan, supra note 95, at 13.
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E. Litigation Involving CJRA Mandatory Disclosure
The various CJRA mandatory disclosure provisions have resulted in a
number of reported cases involving disputes over compliance with disclosure
requirements. 144 Initially, some disputes over mandatory disclosure must be
expected since it is a major departure from our traditional adversarial system.
Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr.,145 has had to resolve mandatory disclosure
disputes during his CJRA experiment. In a patent infringement case, Paradigm
Sales, Inc. v. Weber Marking Systems, Inc.,146 the plaintiff challenged the
defendant's narrow construction of Judge Miller's disclosure rule. The
defendant, construing the rule as only requiring disclosure of information
bearing significantly on its own claims and defenses, claimed that the "'only
developed defense at this time is the defense of noninfringement." 147 Judge
Miller stated that his "order cannot be construed to require a party to disclose
information concerning unpleaded claims and defenses."148 Judge Miller
denied as premature the plaintiff's motion for exclusion of evidence, to compel
evidence, and for sanctions. 149 But, Judge Miller also stated, "If full disclosure
has been made on the noninfringement defense and Paradigm suspects Weber
is holding back other defenses for tactical purposes, Paradigm may object on
that ground to any motion to amend the pleadings."'15
In Hunter v. Surgitek/Medical Engineering Corp.,151 the plaintiffs obtained the
mandatory disclosure from the defendants pursuant to Judge Miller's CJRA
mandatory disclosure rule.1 52 The plaintiffs, without providing their own
disclosures, then sought to dismiss the case without prejudice so they could
refile in a state court which did not use mandatory disclosure. 153 The
defendants, opposing the dismissal, argued they would have been unduly
prejudiced because the plaintiffs had an unfair tactical advantage due to their
14 4See, e.g., Clarke v. Mellon Bank, 1993 WL 170950 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concerning a
dispute over the disclosures required by an informal agreement negotiated by the
parties under the court's CJRA plan); Japan Halon Co. v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 155
F.R.D. 626, 629 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that the parent company of the plaintiff was
subject to mandatory disclosure requirements of the court's CJRA plan).
14SUnited States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. In the Northern
District of Indiana, cited supra note 136, six judges and magistrate judges adopted four
different experimental programs.
146151 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
147 d. at 99.
148Id.
14 9 1d. at 100.
150Id. at 99.
1511992 WL 165819 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
152 d. at "1.
1 5 3 /d.
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failure to disclose.154 Judge Miller granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss
without prejudice on the condition that the plaintiffs pay the defendants' costs
for removing the action to state court and the costs for the defendants'
disclosures made pursuant to Judge Miller's mandatory disclosure rule.155 The
tactics utilized by the plaintiff in Hunter show how even under mandatory
disclosure a lackadaisical or unscrupulous party can unfairly benefit from the
preparation of a party opponent.156
In a case in the District of Montana, Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,1 57
the plaintiff objected to Bridgestone's prediscovery disclosure statement.158
Agreeing with the plaintiff, Chief Judge Paul Hatfield 159 ordered Bridgestone
to disclose all potential witnesses and documents "relevant to disputed facts as
framed by the pleadings."160
These mandatory disclosure disputes show how it is inevitable that some
parties will be uncooperative or will seek to manipulate the mandatory
disclosure rules to their tactical advantage. Those judges who utilize
mandatory disclosure in the future must be prepared to force compliance with
the disclosure requirements, using sanctions if necessary.
Opponents of mandatory disclosure will undoubtedly argue that these cases
are examples of satellite litigation caused by mandatory disclosure, and hence,
they show that mandatory disclosure has failed to reduce expense and delays
in litigation. 161 The benefits of mandatory disclosure,162 however, outweigh
1541d.
1551d. at *4-5•
156Justice Robert H. Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor:
"Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions
•.. on wits borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947).
157152 F.R.D. 628 (D. Mont. 1993).
1581d. at 629.
159United States District Court for the District of Montana.
160152 F.R.D. at 632.
161The ABA Litigation Section, which examined fifteen CJRA expense and delay
reduction plans that experimented with mandatory disclosure, foresaw the problem of
satellite litigation in a comment regarding the differences among the plans:
. .. [Tihe nuances of language used by the different plans in their
disclosure requirements are subtle. Yet, these subtleties can greatly
impact the type of disclosure required. What, for example, is the
difference between documents that are "likely" and those that are
"reasonably likely" to bear significantly on the claims and defenses?
How does a "general description" differ from a "description"? Is pro-
viding a "description" of an insurance agreement tantamount to pro-
viding its "contents"? And, importantly, upon whom does the duty
of interpretation fall? These and other ambiguities leave the area of
automatic disclosure ripe for controversy.
LITIGATION SECTION, supra note 20, at 25-26.
162See discussion of mandatory disclosure benefits in Part V.B.1.
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the costs of litigation incidental to mandatory disclosure. Further, while
mandatory disclosure may cause some new satellite litigation, there will be a
corresponding reduction of satellite litigation from the old system of discovery.
Finally, whereas the old system of adversarial discovery encourages satellite
litigation, litigation incidental to mandatory disclosure should taper off as
parties become accustomed to the new system of cooperative discovery.
F CIRA as a Justiftcation for Courts to Curb Discovery Abuse
The Civil Justice Reform Act appears to have heightened the awareness of
some federal judges to the expense and delays caused by discovery abuse. Also,
a number of judges have invoked the Civil Justice Reform Act to justify
discovery orders,163 and a few judges have repeatedly relied on the CJRA in
issuing discovery orders.164
1635ee, e.g., Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (3d Cir. 1992) (CJRA justified
dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's case when delay resulted from a deliberate
defiance of a court order); Sussman v. Stem, 1994 WL 177788 at l (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (CJRA
justified denial of plaintiff's request for a three-year extension of discovery deadlines);
Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 1994 WL 75055 at *2 (N.D. 111. 1994) (denying
plaintiff's discovery motions because the benefits would not exceed the costs under the
district court's CJRA plan); Tagupa v. Odo, 843 F. Supp. 630,633 (D. Haw. 1994) (CJRAjustified denial of an interpreter so plaintiff could answer defendant's deposition
questions in the Hawaiian language instead of English); Wilson v. Bradlees of New
England, 1994 WL 263695 at *3 (D. N.H. 1994) (CJRA justified a motion to compel
discovery because the benefit to the plaintiff's case outweighed the burden of the cost
to the defendant in producing the information); Foray v. Cooper, 1993 WL 453473 at *1
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (CJRA delay concerns justified limiting the extension of time given to a
plaintiff to find a new expert witness when the request was made five weeks prior to
date set for trial); Austin Fireworks, Inc. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 1993 WL 340033 at *1 (D. Kan.
1993) (Judge Theis found the CJRA justified denying a motion to reconsider plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the case without prejudice so plaintiff could refile with additional
claims); Anthis v. Shalala, 1993 WL 108066 at "1 (D. Kan. 1993) (Judge Theis found CJRA
justified a court policy of limiting continuances in social security cases); Black v. Shalala,
1993 WL 108067 at *1 (D. Kan. 1993) (Judge Theis found CJRA justified a court policy of
limiting continuances in social security cases); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor
Industries, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072,1077 (W.D. Miss. 1993) (CJRA delay concerns justified
a denial of defendant's stay of a judgment for plaintiff patent holder pending appeal);
Schwarzkopf Technologies Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 142 F.R.D. 420,423 (D.
Del. 1992) (CJRA plan required counsel to certify that their clients had been advised of
the estimated cost of the litigation); Harlan v. Lewis, 141 F.R.D. 107,108 (E.D. Ark. 1992)
(CJRA plan justified sanctioning defense attorneys who abused litigation).
164 For example, Judge Eduardo Robreno, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennyslvania, has used the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's CJRA plan
when parties delayed discovery. See Capek v. Mendelson, 143 F.R.D. 97,97-98 (E.D. Pa.
1992) ("[Lieft to their own devices, the litigants in this case will continue to squander
not only their own time and money but will continue to call upon scarce judicial
resources. [citation to CJRA omitted] In light of this... I will deny all the discovery
motions now pending and, in their place, will enter a case management order ... setting
forth in detail theprocedure which will govern future progress of the litigation."); Martin
v. Cooper Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 372, 373-74 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (invoking
the CJRA as justification for denying the parties an extension of discovery time when
the parties ignored the scheduling order under the court's CJRA plan).
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In Mindek v. Rigatti,165 the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice
of the plaintiffs' case because the plaintiffs had failed to follow a magistrate
judge's order directing them to file an amended complaint alleging their injury
in more specific terms.166 The dismissal was justified by the CJRA despite the
fact that the Mindeks' complaint was filed prior to Congress's passage of the
CJRA.167 The Third Circuit stated, "To tolerate the delays caused by the
Mindeks, or to equivocate over lesser sanctions, would make a mockery of the
very objectives of the 'civil justice expense and delay reduction plans' which
the district courts have developed and implemented pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 .. ..168
Judge Roderick R. McKelvie 169 has cited to the CJRA in three opinions.170 In
Wesley-lessen Corp. v. Pilkington Visioncare, Inc.,171 Visioncare sought a motion
to compel Wesley-Jessen to provide interrogatory responses after it found
Wesley-Jessen's original answers to be "vague and unresponsive."172 Judge
McKelvie, in ordering that Wesley-Jessen would be limited at trial to using only
witnesses and documents disclosed in response to Visioncare's discovery
requests, explained,
This type of discovery dance occurs fairly frequently in patent cases,
as counsel work to maneuver the case from complaint through
Also, Magistrate Judge Mark W. Bennett, United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, has cited to the CJRA in four of his opinions: Hose v. Chicago
& Northwestern Transportation Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (citing the
CJRA to justify a reduction of expert witness fees from $800 per hour to $400 per hour
for an expert neurologist); Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 624,633 (S.D. Iowa
1993) (citing to the CJRA in modifying a protective order to allow intervenors access to
the discovery of the original parties); Foxley Cattle Co. v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co.,
142 F.R.D. 677, 682 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (citing the CJRA as justification for reducing an
award of attorneys fees from a requested $2,205.86 to $294 following a successful motion
to compel answers to interrogatories); and Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493,
497 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (citing the CJRA to justify a reduction of expert witness fees from
$500 per hour to $250 per hour for an engineer/accident reconstruction expert).




169United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
17OWesley-Jessen Corp. v. Pilkington Visioncare, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 987,989-90 (D. Del.
1994) (citing the CJRA as a reason for limiting discovery); Thorn EMI North Am., Inc.
v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 623 (D. Del. 1993) (citing CJRA in limiting
discovery); Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sussex County, 831 F. Supp. 1111, 1130 (D.
Del. 1993) (preventing delay under the CJRA cited as a reason for denying a motion to
certify a state law issue).
171844 F. Supp. 987 (D. Del. 1994).
172 d. at 989.
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discovery to settlement or trial. To a judge, it can look like a mild
stonewall, a ploy to force the opposing party to be the first to disclose
the basis for its contentions, or an invitation to settle a case before the
costs get out of control. With the passage of the Civil Justice Reform
Act and the implementation of early trial dates, the tempo of the
[discovery] dance is becoming a little faster. As a consequence, counsel
take on an increased risk in accepting a non-responsive discovery
response, whether it is a failure to answer contention interrogatories,
a refusal to identify expert opinions to be offered at triaolr a delay in
making available confidential commercial information.
In Wilson v. Bradlees of New England,174 the court upheld a magistrate judge's
order compelling the defendant to answer interrogatories. Chief Judge Joseph
A. Diclerico, Jr.,175 set forth a general warning to litigants in his district,
[S]ince all civil cases currently pending in this district will be
handled in accordance with the [CJRA] plan, counsel can anticipate
closer scrutiny by the court of discovery matters. Counsel are advised
that they are expected to exercise reasonable restraint in discovery
matters and to engage in good faith communications with each other
to resolve discovery disputes through cooperation and agreement.
Counsel have an obligation to 'tailor interrogatories to suit the
particular exigencies of the litigation. They ought not be permitted to
use broadswords where scalpels will suffice, nor to undertake wholly
exploratory operations in the vague hope that something helpful will
turn up.' Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179,187 (1st
Cir. 1989). Failure to heed the court's warning will result in the
imposition of sanctions on any counsel found by the court to have
acted unreasonably in any discovery matter.
176
In Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital,177 the plaintiff had taken eight
depositions, seven of which took two to six days to conduct.178 The plaintiff's
depositions generated 5,400 pages of transcripts, of which only 16 pages
involved defense counsel. 179 The plaintiff then sought additional depositions,
additional interrogatories, and 190 requests for admissions in addition to 64
prior requests for admissions. 180 The plaintiff also issued a "Fourth" and
173Id. at 989-90.
1741994 WL 263695 (D. N.H. 1994).
175United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
176Bradlees, 1994 WL 263695 at *3.
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"Amended Fifth" set of document requests.181 Chief Judge James B. Moran 182
denied the plaintiff's discovery motions, explaining,
Discovery in a civil action is not some fundamental right, to be
pursued as long and to whatever extent as a party may desire. It is a
rather recent innovation. Indeed, in criminal cases, where the stakes
are often far higher than they are in civil cases, the discovery remains
limited. Experience has demonstrated that the discovery rules can be
and sometimes are abused, and there is presently an ongoing effort to
curb such abuses ....
The Advisory Group, which developed the recommendations upon
which the Plan is based, concluded that the scope of allowable
discovery should balance cost against likely benefit. It suggests that
cost-shifting be considered when the scope of discovery moves toward
being overly burdensome and expensive. That suggestion echoes the
clear results of a survey of federal practitioners in this district.
The discovery rules are not a ticket to an unlimited, never-ending
exploration of every conceivable matter that captures an attorney's
interest. Parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to investigate183
the facts--and no more ....
It is interesting that the CJRA appears to have heightened the awareness of
some federal judges to the expense and delays caused by discovery abuse. Also,
it is notable that some judges have used the Act as a sort of congressional
mandate for cracking down on discovery abuse.
G. Lessons from the CJRA Early Implementation Districts
It is still too early to draw conclusions from the CJRA experiments in civil
justice reform. The pending RAND Corporation study184 of the CJRA reform
experiments, due in mid-1996, will provide the best information available
about the success of the reform experiments.
Clearly, one lesson can be learned from the CJRA early implementation
districts: given the opportunity, district courts will devise case management
rules that are non-uniform. Non-uniform rules, however, should not
automatically be deemed inefficient. Instead of micromanaging district court
judges through uniform rules, greater efficiency will be achieved by allowing
district court judges the freedom to devise their own case management rules.
181Id.
18 2United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
1831994 WL 75055 *1-2.
184See RAND Corporation study discussion supra note 63.
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
The reforms resulting from the Civil Justice Reform Act will take the
American civil justice system into the next century. While it is too soon to
evaluate the CJRA experiments, the experiments and the Local Rules Project185
have shown that district court judges are concerned about case management
and will develop their own case management rules to address those concerns.
A. A Proposalfor Balkanizing Case Management Rules
The CJRA has been criticized as "balkanizing" the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.186 As demonstrated by the Local Rules Project, however, the
uniformity created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a fallacy. The local
rules which permeate the federal court system should not be automatically
viewed as a negative; on the contrary, they can result in greater case
management efficiency in the federal courts.
1. The Planned Reversion to "Uniform" Rules
The Civil Justice Reform Act culminates with the Judicial Conference (with
the assistance of the RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice)
undertaking "an unprecedented empirical analysis of the plans' effectiveness
in the pilot and demonstration districts so that it may recommend uniform
solutions to Congress by the end of 1995."187 The Judicial Conference is
supposed to reinstate uniformity to the federal system based on the results of
the CJRA study.188 The Civil Justice Reform Act experiments are supposed to
conclude in 1997, and by that time a new set of uniform Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure utilizing the successful experiments will presumably have been
crafted.18 9
2. Why Uniform Case Management Rules Should Be Abandoned
The worst thing the Judicial Conference and Congress could do at the end
of the CJRA experiment is to ignore its most plain lesson-given the
opportunity, district courts and district court judges will devise their own
distinct case management rules. Additional support for this conclusion was
185 See Discussion of Local Rules Project supra note 53. If federal district court judges
were not concerned about case management, why would they promulgate more than
5,000 local rules nationwide?
186 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 53.
187Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: Congress and the Courts: Our
Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1994) (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV
1992)). The Judicial Conference's deadline for reporting to Congress has been extended
to the end of 1996. Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420,108 Stat. 4343,
4345, § 4.
188Biden, supra note 187, at 1294.
18 91d.
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provided by the Local Rules Project, which found more than 5,000 local rules
in the federal court system.190 Many of the local rules, which primarily
concerned pretrial procedures, were found to conflict with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and to conflict district court to district court.191 It is not
surprising that district courts would devise their own pretrial rules in the
absence of national rules. But, it is surprising that district courts will create their
own pretrial rules in spite of the existence of uniform federal rules.
a. The Distinction Between Civil Procedure and Case Management
As noted earlier,192 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated
for a unified federal court system with a goal of eliminating the "sporting theory
of justice." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remain an important unifying
feature of the federal court system, and it would be unwise to completely
abandon them. The 1994 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
carried forward the 1980 and 1983 amendment's propensity to mandate
"active" judicial case management by requiring judges to control discovery and
to sanction attorneys for discovery abuse.193 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, should be rules of civil procedure--not rules of judicial
case management.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should set forth uniform procedures
for things such as service of process, joinder of parties, conducting trials,
providing judgments, and issuing injunctions. How a judge manages the
pretrial discovery of his cases, however, should be left to the discretion of each
district court.194
b. The Benefits of Decentralized Case Management
The concept that the United States is indivisible is a vital element of our
nation; the diversity of our nation's people, however, is one of the tremendous
strengths of our nation. All federal judges are not the same: they come from
different backgrounds and cultures and have differing world views and habits.
It is natural for each federal judge to have his own approach to his duties.
Consequently, a single uniform set of case management rules will not make the
judges uniform, more efficient, or more just. In the end, we must have faith in
the case management competence of our unbeholden, life-tenured Article III
190CoMMITrEE ON ROFPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 1 (1989).
1911d. at 1-2.
192See supra part 1I.B.
193See Dudley, supra note 7, at 189-90 (discussing how the 1980 and 1983 amendments
"encourage judges to become pervasively and actively involved in case management
early in litigation and to ride herd on discovery").
194The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, can be a useful means of providing
a model case management system for judges. See infra Part V.A.4.
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judges, and we must have confidence in their dedication to maintaining their
dockets.
Decentralization of case management will benefit our justice system in many
ways. Different regions of the nation have differing needs when it comes to
case management. 195 Since before the adoption of the federal rules in 1938, it
has been recognized that different regions of the nation have varied needs. 196
Permitting federal judges the independence to devise their own case
management techniques will allow regional needs to be met.
Additionally, there is no consensus on the need for discovery reform. 19 7
Decentralization of case management will allow those courts with no discovery
abuse problems to maintain a system which works (and does not need to be
fixed). Providing judges with greater discretion in case management also will
provide federal judges the flexibility to specially craft a discovery plan for
problem cases. For example, if a judge believes that a particular case needs
special "hands on" case management-perhaps because the attorneys have a
reputation for discovery abuse--then decentralization of case management
will allow the judge to address the problem by crafting a special case
management plan.198
Finally, allowing district court judges discretion in how to manage their
dockets will allow innovative procedures, such as mandatory disclosure and
summary jury trials, to develop in the federal system.199 Requiring judges to
follow a uniform set of case management rules through the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will stagnate the development of new case management
techniques. The development of new case management techniques is vital to
our civil justice system's ability to keep pace with the future demands of
American society.
195 See Judge Sanders' comment that discovery abuse is primarily a problem in
metropolitan areas supra note 7.
196See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2008 (1989)
(discussing how Senator Thomas Walsh, a progressive Democrat from Montana who
opposed uniform federal rules, believed that different regions of the country need
different rules).
197See, e.g., supra note 7. Also, the CJRA advisory groups of some district courts
discovered no expense or delay problems in their civil litigation dockets. See, e.g., United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, REPORT OF THE ADVIsORY GROUP
OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DIsTRIcT OF ILLINOIS, § II (Dec.
12, 1991) (stating "that there are no unusual cost and delay problems in this District at
this time").
198 See supra part IV.F (citing examples of special discovery orders).
199 See Levin, supra note 53, at 1581-82 (discussing how the local rules of district courts
can act as experiments in laboratories).
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3. Providing Greater Judicial Discretion in Case Management
District court judges should be allowed the freedom to devise their own
individual approach to case management. After all, it is the district judges who
must work day-in and day-out with their dockets. When the Judicial
Conference and Congress redraft the case management aspect of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,200 they should not draft a detailed set of uniform case
management rules that reduce trial judges to glorified calendaring clerks.20 1
Instead, they should draft a model set of case management rules which will
allow district courts the discretion to devise their own case management
systems.202
Justice Ben F. Overton203 turned to Bouvier's Law Dictionary in defining
Judicial Discretion,
'That part of the judicial function which decides questions arising
in the trial of a cause, according to the particular circumstances of the
case, and as to which the judgment of the court is uncontrolled by fixed
rules of law.
The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no
strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the
circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of
the court.'
204
Justice Overton also identified two reasons for providing judges discretion:
"First, the trial judge is the only objective person who is on the scene and who
is able to see, hear and evaluate the situation from firsthand knowledge.
Second, no strict rule can be made applicable for every conceivable situation
in the many areas of the law."20 5 These two reasons exist in the area of judicial
200See supra part V.A.1 (discussing the planned reinstatement of uniformity to the
federal rules).
2011 have taken this language from Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice
Reform in the United States--Opportunity for Learning from 'Civilized' European Procedure
Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 153-54 (1994). Stiefel and Maxeiner
argue that the move in federal courts toward active case management makes "the judge
a glorified calendaring clerk," and they support the adoption of a German civil law type
system of civil justice along the lines of Professor Langbein's proposal. Id. at 157; see
citation to Professor Langbein's proposal infra note 228. 1 favor active case management,
although I do not believe it should be or can be forced upon Article III judges.
202 The current Rule 26(a)(1), which allows district courts the ability to opt out of the
Rule's mandatory disclosure scheme, provides an example of how district courts can be
reserved this power.
20 3Supreme Court, State of Florida.
204Ben F. Overton, The Meaning of Judicial Discretion, in JUDICIAL DISCRETION 1991 8
(National Judicial College, ABA 1991) (quoting BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 884-85 (3d
ed. 1914)).
2 051d. at 3.
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case management. While judicial discretion in case management may be
appropriate, to what extent should discretion be given to judges in managing
cases?
Professor Maurice Rosenberg classifies judicial discretion as primary or
secondary.206 The primary form of judicial discretion focuses on whether a rule
provides a judge with decision-making discretion; the secondary form of
judicial discretion focuses on the appellate court's ability to review and reverse
the trial court.207 The primary form is liberating, while the secondary form is
restraining.208
In the context of case management rulings, the authority for providing
judges with discretion in case management should be granted through the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The secondary form of discretion would be
the standard of review which would be applied to the resulting case
management decisions.
Justice Richard W. Wallach 209 classifies the standards of review applied to
judicial discretion into four categories: (1) unfettered discretion; (2) a
presumption of validity, with a high degree of appellate deference to the trial
judge; (3) some appellate deference but the trial judge's basis for exercising
discretion must appear; and, (4) lip service obeisance to the trial court's
discretion.210 Case management and trial procedural rulings have been subject
to a presumption of validity, with appellate courts giving a high degree of
deference to the trial judge.211 The rationale for presuming that the case
management rulings of a trial judge are valid is that the trial judge has a
"superior vantage point" in assessing the circumstances of the parties and the
needs of the case.212 Thus, a district court judge's discretionary rulings on case
management should have a presumption of validity with a high degree of
deference by reviewing courts. This means that the standard of review used by
appellate courts would be an abuse of discretion standard and that an appellate
court's review would be limited to whether the trial judge acted arbitrarily or
irrationally.




209Supreme Court, State of New York.
21 0Richard W. Wallach, Judicial Discretion: How Much, in JUDICIAL DIScRETION 1991
8-12 (National Judicial College, ABA 1991).
211Id. at 10-11 (citing to McCrossen v. United States, 339 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1965)
(presuming the validity of a ruling limiting a cross-examination on the ground of
repetition); Thurmond v. Superior Court, 427 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1967) (sustaining the power
of the trial court to manage its own calendar except where an abuse of discretion
appears)).
2 12 Cf id. at 10.
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4. Establishing a Case Management Model
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not dictate to district court
judges how to manage their cases, the rules can be a source of guidance by
providing discovery goals and model case management rules.
For example, one discovery goal could be: "Parties should be encouraged to
cooperate from the outset of litigation by meeting to plan their discovery so
that it is conducted in the most just, speedy and cost efficient manner."213 The
federal rules could then provide a series of model case management rules
214
which district courts would be free to adopt, modify, or opt out of in favor of
devising their own case management rules.
This approach is basically a variation on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as they currently exist since Rule 83 permits district courts to make rules that
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under my
approach, however, the district courts would be given greater latitude in
making case management rules.215
As Rule 83 currently requires, control over the case management rules can
be maintained by making them subject to approval by the respective circuit
courts. If a judge oversteps the bounds of the Constitution by misapplying local
case management rules (previously approved by the circuit court), then he will
run the risk of being overturned on appeal.
For example, district courts have struggled with the issue of whether
summary jury trials are permitted under the Constitution and the statutory
framework of the federal courts. Summary jury trials are non-binding
proceedings designed to expedite settlement. Ajury is empaneled, both parties
provide a cursory explanation of what evidence they would produce at trial,
and the jury then gives a non-binding verdict which enables the parties to
assess whether to settle the case.216 The Sixth Circuit has held that district
judges cannot force parties to participate in summary jury trials.217 This
experience with the summary jury trial shows how judicial discretion in case
management can be kept in check.
Thus, district court judges and practitioners should be able to look to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a general guide which sets forth discovery
goals and model case management techniques. If a judge finds that a certain
case management technique works, that judge should have the option of
utilizing that technique. In regard to mandatory disclosure, some district court
judges have established very efficient means of managing discovery without
213 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
214 These "model" federal rules could implement the case management techniques
found to be successful in the Civil Justice Reform Act experiments.
215Rule 83, however, should be modified so district courts and judges cannot devise
or implement rules in a manner which is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.
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mandatory disclosure; other judges may have already found mandatory
disclosure to be of use in some circumstances.
B. The Utility of Mandatory Disclosure as a Discretionary Local Rule
Mandatory disclosure provides an example of how a case management
technique can be incorporated as a model rule in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district courts with the busiest dockets may find a resource
differentiated discovery approach to mandatory disclosure appealing. As
previously explained, it is improbable that this approach would work in all
federal courts.218
1. Rationale for Adopting Mandatory Disclosure
Historically, the civil procedure rules have strived to achieve just ends by the
most efficient means. No civil justice system will be perfect, primarily because
the system is applied to a constantly changing society with infinite variables.219
We can, however, seek perfection by adjusting the system to meet the changing
needs of society.
The goals in drafting the federal rules were to simplify civil procedure by
merging law and equity and to reduce procedural injustices while increasing
efficiency through the use of uniform procedures.220 The needs of society today,
however, are very different than they were in 1939.221 Although there may not
be a need for civil justice reform in all district courts, 222 some of the changes,
such as the transformation of judges from neutral referees to managers,223 will
resound nationwide.
Another emerging transformation in the civil justice system is a shift in the
culture of discovery from an adversarial game to a cooperative joint effort,
which includes the development of mandatory disclosure.224 The trend toward
forced cooperation in discovery also can be discerned from the recently
2 18See supra part V.A.2.b.
219Cf Subrin, supra note 196, at 2046, 2051 (commenting on how the legal culture
constantly reshapes the demands placed on our procedural system); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Comment: Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 640-41, 648 (1989)
(commenting on the problem of multi-factor standards and characterizing the problem
as one of legal culture); see also Green & Brown, supra note 2, at 228-29 (attributing the
civil justice crisis to societal changes, such as individual expectations of a risk-free
environment).
2 20 See Brazil, supra note 8, at 1298-1300; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 36-38.
2 21 See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 3841.
2 22See supra note 7 (comment of Judge Barefoot Sanders).
223 See Schwarzer, supra note 8, at 704.
224 See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 48-51; see also Landsman, supra note 42, at 501-21
(discussing the declining reliance on various facets of the adversarial process in the
pursuit of civil justice reform).
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developed "spoliation of evidence" tort225 and from the willingness of courts
to impose sanctions for the destruction of documents prior to litigation being
initiated.226
The adversarial process has been used by courts in the United States since
its inception,227 but this approach has been attacked in recent decades as
fomenting abuse and misuse of the civil justice system.228 The duty placed on
counsel to disclose relevant information in civil litigation has lagged behind
criminal discovery where, in Brady v. Maryland,229 the Supreme Court
mandated that criminal prosecutors disclose relevant information to the
defendant.230
2 25See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463-64 (Alaska 1986); Smith
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829,832-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473
So.2d 1307,1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986); Ricardo
G. Cedillo & David Lopez, Document Destruction in Business Litigationfrom a Practitioner's
Point-of-View: The Ethical Rules vs. Practical Realities, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 637,652-53 (1989);
Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1091-94 (1987). But see Baugher v. Gates
Rubber Co., Inc., 863 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993), for a discussion of
jurisdictions that have refused to recognize a claim for intentional spolia tion of evidence
where the facts of the case would not support a cause of action even if the tort were
recognized.
226 See, e.g., William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443,
1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Lewis v. Darce Towing Co., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982); In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 750, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Bowmar
Instrument Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 423, 426-27
(N.D. Ind. 1977).
Well-counseled businesses have document-retention plans, whereby documents
and computer files are stored for a specific period of time and then destroyed. The
strategy behind a document retention plan is two-fold: to eliminate potentially
damaging evidence (to destroy the paper-trail) before a duty to disclose ripens and to
streamline business operations by reducing the amount of unnecessary information
floating around (a clean house is an efficient house). Dale A. OesterleA Private Litigant's
Remediesforan Opponent's Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV.
1185, 1185-87 (1983); see Cedillo & Lopez, supra note 225, at 646-49; Solum & Marzen,
supra note 225, at 1196-97. Mandatory disclosure further cements the emerging duty on
lawyers and parties to preserve and turn over relevant evidence.
22 7Landsman, supra note 42, at 487; see also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 18-25 (1984) (chronicling the development of the
American adversarial justice system).
228 See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 8, at 1303-05; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,841-48 (1985); seealso Landsman, supra note 42,
at 501-21 (discussing reform efforts affecting the adversarial process).
229373 U.S. 83 (1963).
230 See Frankel, supra note 47, at 53; Colin Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and
The Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
237, 238-40, 247 (1993). Also, Criminal Rule of Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) states:
(C) Documents and Tangible Objects. Upon request of the defendant
the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,
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The objective of mandatory disclosure-to require litigants to cooperate in
the disclosure and exchange of basic factual information-will drastically
change the adversarial nature of discovery in civil litigation.231 Like criminal
prosecutions, though, the adversarial nature of civil litigation need not be
entirely abandoned-particularly when a genuine dispute of material fact
exists. 232 If discovery with mandatory disclosure shows that each party's
position has merit, then our adversarial trial system remains the best system
for resolving the dispute. Mandatory disclosure will help parties expeditiously
resolve those cases where the parties believe the benefit of negotiated
settlement outweighs the risk of losing at trial. Thus, the earlier that basic
information is disclosed and exchanged in a civil case, the greater the likelihood
that the parties will achieve an early negotiated settlement. This speedier
termination of cases will result in reduced litigation for the parties and will help
speed up the turnaround of cases on federal court dockets.
2. Why a Resource-Differentiated Discovery Approach to Mandatory
Disclosure Should Be Undertaken
The federal rules developed as transsubstantive rules, that is, as a uniform
set of rules to be applied uniformly to all types of substantive law.233 Some legal
commentators have asserted, however, that greater efficiency would result if
different procedural rules existed for different substantive cases.234 Attempting
buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within
the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are
material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended
for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were
obtained from or belong to the defendant.
Criminal Procedure Rule 16(a)(2) protects the government's privileged information,
except for statements of witnesses subject to disclosure at trial under the Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500.
231 See generally Brazil, supra note 8.
232See LANDSMAN, supra note 227, at 44-51 (providing a cogent defense of various
components of the adversarial system).
23 3See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975); see also Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The
Proliferation ofAd Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175-76 (1989) (explaining how
the premise of trans-substantive rules has been eroded by ad hoc informal, customized
procedures devised by judges to cope with the difficulties posed by the modern
caseload); Subrin, supra note 196, at 2012 (noting that the plethora of local rules
promulgated under FED. R. Civ. P. 83 has become "a gaping hole" in "the wall of
uniformity").
234 See Cover, supra note 233, at 732-33; Subrin, supra note 196, at 2000, 2006, 2042-43.
Professor Subrin explained the possible application of uniform federal rules that are not
trans-substantive by stating:
It is logically possible that one could have the same procedural rules
in all federal courts, but that those rules would not be trans-substan-
tive. There could be different procedural rules for different substantive
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to tailor procedure around substance by developing non-transsubstantive
rules, however, is inherently impractical because of technical and political
obstacles.235
While I disagree with tailoring procedural rules to the substantive matter of
specific cases, there is truth to Professor Maurice Rosenberg's statement that:
'The key point is that different categories of cases have different processing
needs. These are identifiable, classifiable, and usable in putting them through
the judicial process." 23 6 Instead of categorizing cases by the substantive law
they involve, I propose that they be categorized according to the different
resources that certain types of cases commonly require. My proposal for
resource differentiated mandatory disclosure is a variation on the CJRA
experiment with Differentiated Case Management. 237
3. A Proposal for Resource-Differentiated Mandatory Disclosure
Some courts could effectively utilize mandatory disclosure by structuring
mandatory disclosure so that it will fulfill the different discovery needs of
different categories of cases. To do this, cases must be categorized, not by their
substantive law content, but by the different court resources they utilize. As
noted by the Advisory Group for the Southern District of New York: "In theory,
[differentiated case management] represents a rethinking of the assumption
that it is appropriate to subject all cases to the same procedural rules. Instead,
[differentiated case management] seeks to make an assessment of the
managerial and procedural requirements of each case and then tailor judicial
resources accordingly."238
cases. For example, the pleading requirements required in antitrust
cases might differ from those in automobile tort suits.
Subrin, supra note 196, at 2006. One practical problem with classifying cases according
to substantive law is that some cases could not be placed into a single substantive law
category since cases frequently contain combinations of substantive law. For example,
breach of contract cases frequently include actions for fraud.
235 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,2244 (1989).
236 Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243,
248(1984).
23728 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp. 111990). A report by the Brookings Institution Task
Force on Civil Justice Reform provided the basis for the CJRA experimentation with
differentiated case management. Mullenix, supra note 7, at 389; United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, PILOT DISTRICT, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
ADVISORY GROUP, § IV.A (Nov. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Southern District of New York
Advisory Group Report]; see BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 3.
238 Southern District of New York Advisory Group Report, supra note 237, § IV.B.
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Mandatory disclosure should be classified into two tracks: discovery-simple
cases and discovery-intensive cases.239 Designation of a case as
discovery-simple or discovery-intensive would be made by a judge during the
scheduling conference after conferring with the parties.240 Some flexibility, of
course, is necessary in designating cases as discovery-simple or
discovery-intensive; the judge must be able to redesignate a case in the event
that a case, initially tracked as being discovery-simple, evolves241 into a
discovery-intensive case.
a. Discovery-Simple Cases
Discovery-simple cases would be those cases that: (1) require the discovery
of not more than 10,000 pages of documents for each party; (2) have not more
than five real parties in interest; (3) have not more than ten fact witnesses; (4)
have not more than three expert witnesses; and (5) would require not more than
ten days of trial time.242 Mandatory disclosure in discovery-simple cases
should be structured to complete discovery as expeditiously as possible
because of the relative simplicity of the discovery needs of these cases.
Automatic document production of all nonprivileged documents is the key
element to expediting discovery-simple cases. Four of the early
2391n devising my proposal, I examined various CJRA early implementation district
court experiments with differentiated case management. The Southern District of New
York developed a differential case management system which classified cases as
complex, standard, or expedited. Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at
1-4. The Northern District of Ohio, which was designated as a demonstration district
under the CJRA, also experimented with differentiated case management. See United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, DIFFERENTIATED CASE
MANAGEMENT PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF OHIO, § 8 (Dec. 13, 1991) [hereinafter Northern District of Ohio Plan] (outlining five
case management tracks: expedited, standard, complex, administrative, and mass tort).
I propose that only two tracks are needed for mandatory disclosure. Cases could,
however, be broken down further into other resource-based categories to improve
management in other areas of discovery.
2 40The CJRA pilot plan for the District of Delaware established a variation on
differentiated case management by setting up special procedures for cases designated
as complex. See generally District of Delaware Plan, supra note 85. In United States v.
Diamond Indus., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 48 (D. Del. 1992), the court denied the parties request to
have their case redesignated as complex.
24 1For example, a case can become complex when a plaintiff amends its complaint to
add additional causes of action.
242 See Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 2 (defining an expedited
case as "one which is relatively simple, where it is believed that there will be no more
than one or two depositions by each party; where the documents to be exchanged are
clear-cut in nature and relatively small in volume; where the use of interrogatories will
be minimal; where there will be little or no motion practice; and where relatively littlejudicial supervision is needed") Northern District of Ohio Plan, supra note 239, at Rule
8:2.2 (characterizing an expedited case as involving a few legal issues, having few parties
in interest, having more than five witnesses, having no expert witnesses, and requiring
more than five trial days).
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implementation districts mandated the production of all relevant
documents. 243 The provision requiring automatic document production
should be modeled after the Northern District of California Plan,244 which set
forth very specific procedures requiring a party whose disclosure includes
more than one hundred pages of documents to contact opposing counsel to
plan the exchange.245
In addition to automatic document production, parties with
discovery-simple cases would be required to exchange disclosure statements
revealing the identity of persons known to have information or knowledge
relevant to the litigation, the existence and content of insurance agreements
relevant to the litigation, and a calculation of any damages claimed in any
pleading.246
b. Discovery-Intensive Cases
Discovery-intensive cases would be those cases that: (1) require the
discovery of more than 10,000 pages of documents for each party; (2) have more
than five real parties in interest; (3) have more than ten fact witnesses; (4) have
more than three expert witnesses; or (5) would take more than seven days of
trial time.247 Because discovery in these cases is more complex, mandatory
disclosure should be structured to quickly exchange basic information so that
the parties can more efficiently proceed with further discovery through
document requests, depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admissions.
Therefore, mandatory disclosure in discovery-intensive cases should be
accomplished through the means of standardized disclosure statements
directed at basic categories of information.
The disclosure statement model was experimented with by ten of the early
implementation districts. 248 Drawing on these examples, the standardized
243 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
244 Northem District of California Plan, supra note 96, § VII.C.
2451d.
246 See text accompanying supra note 122 for discussion of experimental plans
requiring disclosure of this type of information.
24 7See Southern District of New York Plan, supra note 96, at 3-4 (defining a complex
case as involving "numerous depositions, exchanges of large quantities of documents,
lengthy interrogatories" and defining a standard case as that "which the parties do not
believe can be tried within one year of filing but which do not involve an unusually large
number of parties, complex issues, or anticipated discovery disputes and motions"
(emphasis in original); Northern District of Ohio Plan, supra note 239, at Rule 8:2.2
(characterizing a complex case as involving numerous legal issues, having more than
five parties in interest, having more than ten witnesses, having more than three expert
witnesses, and requiring more than ten trial days; and, characterizing a standard case
as involving more than a few legal issues, with up to five parties in interest, with up to
ten witnesses, with two or three expert witnesses, and requiring five to ten trial days).
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disclosure statements should disclose: (1) a general description and the location
of all documents relevant to the litigation; (2) the identity of persons known to
have information or knowledge relevant to the litigation; (3) the existence and
content of insurance agreements relevant to the litigation; (4) a calculation of
any damages claimed in any pleading; and (5) whether any indispensable
parties need to be added.
c. Timing
The CJRA early implementation districts tie the initial mandatory disclosure
to various events in the litigation, such as when the complaint or its answer is
filed, when a party enters into the action, by the date of the scheduling
conference, or by a date set by the court.249 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a) requires the mandatory disclosures "be made at or within 10 days after
the meeting of the parties" which must be held at least fourteen days prior to
the scheduling conference. The timing prescribed by Rule 26(a) is unnecessarily
complicated250 and does not permit a judicial assessment of the discovery
needs of a case prior to jumping into mandatory disclosure.
Instead, I propose that a scheduling conference be held between the parties
and the judicial officer assigned to the case within thirty days after the filing of
the defendant's answer 251 or removal of the case.252 At the scheduling
conference, the judicial officer would decide whether the case would be tracked
for simple or complex discovery. The initial mandatory disclosures for
discovery-simple cases would be filed within fifteen days of this conference.
The mandatory disclosures for cases requiring complex discovery would be
filed within thirty days of the scheduling conference.
If a case is initially designated as discovery-simple, but evolves into a
discovery-intensive case, the parties would begin using the disclosure
statements for all subsequent disclosures upon redesignation.
249 See supra part IV.D.1 (discussing time variations in the early implementation
districts).
2 5ORule 26(a)(1) states that mandatory disclosures must be made "within 10 days after
the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f)." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1). Subdivision (f)
states that parties shall meet "as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days
before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Rule 16(b) states that a scheduling order "shall issue as soon as
practicable but in any event within 90 days after the appearance of a defendant and
within 120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(b). In total, 116 days could elapse between service of the complaint on the defendant
and mandatory disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1).
251placing the scheduling conference after the defendant files his answer accounts for
the possibility of the defendant filing a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) Motion for More Definite
Statement, which would delay the timing of the defendant's answer.
2 52Some of the CJRA early implementation districts provided for mandatory
disclosure in removed cases. See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 201-2a; Southern District of Illinois
Plan, supra note 85, at 13-14; Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 85, at 2-3.
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d. Retaining District Court Discretion
Mandatory disclosure, as I propose it, should be a rather simple discovery
mechanism that enhances the arsenal of litigation management techniques
available to judicial officers. As explained, it is important for district courts to
retain the ability to devise their own forms of mandatory disclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandatory disclosure is not a panacea for the problems currently plaguing
our civil justice system, but it can be a case management technique that will
improve the efficiency of some courts by reducing litigation costs and by
improving the quality and access of information. To be effective, however,
mandatory disclosure does not need to be a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The micromanagement of federal judges through case management rules in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be abandoned and district courts
should be provided greater discretion in devising case management rules
which meet the unique needs of each district court. Finally, some district courts
may find that greater efficiency also will result by taking a
resource-differentiated approach to mandatory disclosure. If properly utilized
as a Model Rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, mandatory disclosure
could be an effective reform measure for some courts.
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